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Abstract
We study a general stochastic probing problem defined on a universe V , where each element
e ∈ V is “active” independently with probability pe. Elements have weights {we : e ∈ V } and the
goal is to maximize the weight of a chosen subset S of active elements. However, we are given only
the pe values—to determine whether or not an element e is active, our algorithm must probe e. If
element e is probed and happens to be active, then e must irrevocably be added to the chosen set
S; if e is not active then it is not included in S. Moreover, the following conditions must hold in
every random instantiation:
• the set Q of probed elements satisfy an “outer” packing constraint,
• the set S of chosen elements satisfy an “inner” packing constraint.
The kinds of packing constraints we consider are intersections of matroids and knapsacks. Our
results provide a simple and unified view of results in stochastic matching [12, 3] and Bayesian
mechanism design [9], and can also handle more general constraints. As an application, we ob-
tain the first polynomial-time Ω(1/k)-approximate “Sequential Posted Price Mechanism” under
k-matroid intersection feasibility constraints, improving on prior work [9, 25, 19].
1 Introduction
We study an adaptive stochastic optimization problem along the lines of [20, 14, 13, 16]. The stochastic
probing problem is defined on a universe V of elements with weights {we : e ∈ V }. We are also given
two downwards-closed set systems (V, Iin) and (V, Iout), which we call the inner and outer packing
constraints, whose meanings we shall give shortly. For each element e ∈ V , there is a probability pe,
where element e is active/present with this probability, independently of all other elements. We want
to choose a set S ⊆ V of active elements belonging to Iin, i.e., all elements in the chosen set S must
be active and also independent according to the inner packing constraint (S ∈ Iin). The goal is to
maximize the expected weight of the chosen set.
However, the information about which elements are active and which are inactive is not given up-front.
All we know are the probabilities pe, and that the active set is a draw from the product distribution
given by {pe}e∈V —to determine if an element e is active or not, we must probe e. Moreover, if we
probe e, and e happens to be active, then we must irrevocably add e to our chosen set S—we do not
have a right to discard any probed element that turns out to be active. This “query and commit”
model is quite natural in a number of applications such as kidney exchange, online dating and auction
design (see below for details).
Finally, there is a constraint on which elements we can probe: the set Q of elements probed in any run
of the algorithm must be independent according to the outer packing constraint Iout—i.e., Q ∈ Iout.
This is the constraint that gives the probing problem its richness. Since every probed element that
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is active must be included in the solution which needs to maintain independence in Iin, at any point
t (with current solution St and currently probed set Qt) we can only probe those elements e with
Qt ∪ {e} ∈ Iout and St ∪ {e} ∈ Iin.(Indeed, if pe = 0 there is no point probing e; and if pe > 0 there
is a danger that e is active and we will be forced to add it to St, which we cannot if St ∪ {e} 6∈ Iin.)
While the stochastic probing problem seems fairly abstract, it has interesting applications: we give two
applications of this problem, to designing posted-price Bayesian auctions, and to modeling problems
in online dating/kidney exchange. We first state our results and then describe these applications.
1.1 Our Results
For the unweighted stochastic probing problem (i.e., we = 1 for all e ∈ V ), if both inner and outer
packing constraints are given by k-systems1, we consider the greedy algorithm which considers elements
in decreasing order of their probability pe, probing them whenever feasible.
Theorem 1.1 (Unweighted Probing) The greedy algorithm for unweighted stochastic probing achieves
a tight 1kin+kout -approximation ratio, when Iin is a kin-system and Iout is a kout-system.
This result generalizes the greedy 4-approximation algorithm for unweighted stochastic matching, by
Chen et al. [12], where both inner and outer constraints are b-matchings (and hence 2-systems). For
the special case of stochastic matching, Adamczyk [1] gave an improved factor-2 bound. However,
Theorem 1.1 is tight in our setting of general k-systems; its proof is LP-based, and we feel it is much
simpler than previous proofs for the special cases. The main idea of our proof is a dual-fitting argument
that extends the Fisher et al. [15] analysis of the greedy algorithm for k-matroid intersection. In
Section 5 we generalize our unweighted probing result to also handle “global time” constraints, at the
loss of a small constant factor in the approximation ratio (see Theorem 5.1).
There is no known greedy algorithm for stochastic probing in the weighted case (as opposed to the
deterministic setting of finding the maximum weight set subject to a k-system, where greedy gives
a 1/k-approximation [18, 15]); indeed, natural greedy approaches can be arbitrarily bad even for
weighted stochastic matching [12]. Hence, we use an LP relaxation for the weighted probing problem,
where variables correspond to marginal probabilities of probing/choosing elements in the optimal
policy. This is similar to previous works on such adaptive stochastic problems [14, 13, 3]. Our
rounding algorithm is based on the recently introduced notion of contention resolution (CR) schemes
for packing constraints, due to Chekuri et al. [11]. Loosely speaking, given a packing constraint on a
universe V and a fractional solution {xe}e∈V , a CR-scheme is a two-step rounding procedure where
a. Each element e is chosen independently into I1 ⊆ V with probability proportional to xe.
b. A feasible subset I2 ⊆ I1 (suitably computed) is output as the solution.
We show that the existence of suitable CR-schemes for both Iin and Iout imply an approximation
algorithm for weighted stochastic probing, where the approximation ratio depends on the quality of
the two CR-schemes. Our main result for weighted stochastic probing is Theorem 3.4 (which requires
some notation to state precisely), but here is a representative corollary:
Theorem 1.2 (Weighted Probing: Special Case) There is an Ω
(
1
kin+kout
)
-approximation algo-
rithm for weighted stochastic probing when the inner and outer constraints are intersections of kin
1For any integer k, a k-system is a downwards-closed collection of sets I ⊆ 2V such that for any S ⊆ V , the maximal
subsets of S that belong to I can differ in size by at most a factor of k. Examples are intersections of k matroids, and
k-set packing.
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and kout matroids, respectively. Moreover, there is an Ω
(
1
(kin+kout)2
)
-approximation algorithm under
arbitrary kin and kout system constraints.
Some of the other allowed constraints are unsplittable flow on trees (under the “no-bottleneck” as-
sumption) and packing integer programs. Details on the weighted case appear in Section 3.
1.2 Applications
We now give two applications: the first shows how our algorithm for the weighted probing problem
immediately gives us posted price auctions for single parameter settings where the feasibility set is
given by intersections of matroids, the second is an application for dating/kidney exchange. Both of
these extend and generalize previous results in these areas.
Bayesian Auction Design. Consider a mechanism design setting for a single seller facing n single-
parameter buyers. The seller has a feasibility constraint given by a downward-closed set system
I ⊆ 2[n] and is allowed to serve any set of buyers from I. Buyers are single-parameter; i.e., buyer
i’s private data is a single real number vi which denotes his valuation of being served (if i is not
served then he receives zero value). In the Bayesian setting, the valuation vi is drawn from some set
{0, 1, . . . , B} according to probability distribution Di; here we assume that the valuations of buyers
are discrete and independently drawn. The valuation vi is private to the buyer, but the distribution
Di is public knowledge. The goal in these problems is a revenue-maximizing truthful mechanism that
accepts bids from buyers and outputs a feasible allocation (i.e., a set S ∈ I of buyers that receive
service), along with a price that each buyer has to pay for service. A very special type of mechanism is
a Sequential Posted Pricing Mechanism (SPM) that chooses a price for each buyer and makes “take-
it-or-leave-it” offers to the buyers in some order [22, 8, 9]. Such mechanisms are simple to run and
obviously truthful (see [9] for a discussion of other advantages), hence it is of interest to design SPMs
which achieve revenue comparable to the revenue-optimal mechanism.
Designing the best SPM can be cast as a stochastic probing problem on a universe V = {1, 2, . . . , n}×
{0, 1, . . . , B}, where element (i, c) corresponds to offering a price c to buyer i. Element (i, c) has
weight wic = c, which is the revenue obtained if the offer “price c for buyer i” is accepted, and has
probability pic = Prvi∼Di [vi ≥ c], which is the probability that i will indeed accept service at price
c. The inner constraint Iin is now the natural lifting of the actual constraints I to the universe V ,
where {(i, c)}c≥0 are copies of i. The outer constraint Iout requires that at most one of the elements
{(i, c) | c ≥ 0} can be probed for each i: i.e., each buyer i can be offered at most one price. This serves
two purposes: firstly, it gives us a posted-price mechanism. Secondly, we required in our model that
each element (i, c) is active with probability pic, independently of the other elements (i, c
′); however,
the underlying semantics imply that if i accepts price c, then she would also accept any c′ ≤ c, which
would give us correlations. Constraining ourselves to probe at most one element corresponding to
each buyer i means we never probe two correlated elements, and hence the issue of correlations never
arises.
Our results for stochastic probing give near-optimal SPMs for many feasibility constraints. Moreover,
we show that our LP relaxation not only captures the best possible SPMs, but also captures the
optimal truthful mechanism of any form under the Bayes-Nash equilibrium (and hence Myerson’s
optimal mechanism [21]). In the case of k matroid intersection feasibility constraints, our results
give the first polynomial-time sequential posted price mechanisms whose revenue is Ω(1/k) times the
optimum. Previous papers [9, 25, 19] proved the existence of such SPMs, but they were polynomial-
time only for k ≤ 2. For larger k, previous works only showed existence of Ω(1/k)-approximate SPMs,
and polynomial-time implementations of these SPMs only obtained an Ω(1/k2) fraction of the optimal
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revenue. The previous results compare the performance of their SPMs directly to the revenue of the
optimal mechanism [21], whereas we compare our SPMs to an LP relaxation of this mechanism, which
is potentially larger. Moreover, our general framework gives us more power:
• We can handle broader classes of feasibility constraints I, not just matroid intersections: e.g., we
can model auctions involving unsplittable flow on trees, which can be used to capture allocations
of point-to-point bandwidths in a tree-shaped network. This is because the feasibility constraints
I for the auction directly translate into inner constraints for the probing problem.
• We can also handle additional side-constraints to the auction via a richer class of outer con-
straints Iout. For example, the seller may incur costs in the form of time/money to make offers.
Such budget limits can be modeled in the stochastic probing problem as an extra outer knap-
sack constraint, and our algorithm finds approximately optimal SPMs even in this case. More
generally, our algorithm can easily handle a rich class of other resource constraints (matroid in-
tersections, packing IPs etc) on the auction. However, in the presence of these side-constraints,
our algorithm’s revenue is an approximation only to the best SPM satisfying these constraints,
and no longer comparable to the unconstrained optimal mechanism.
Online dating and Kidney Exchange [12] Consider a dating agency with several users. Based
on the profiles of users, the agency can compute the probability that any pair of users will be com-
patible. Whether or not a pair is successfully matched is only known after their date; moreover, in
the case of a match, both users immediately leave the site (happily). Furthermore, each user has a
patience/timeout level, which is the maximum number of failed dates after which he/she drops out
of the site (unhappily). The objective of the dating site is to schedule dates so as to maximize the
expected number of matched pairs. (Similar constraints arise in kidney exchange systems.) This can
be modeled as stochastic probing with the universe V being edges of the complete graph whose nodes
correspond to users. The inner constraints specify that the chosen edges be a matching in G. The
outer constraints specify that for each node j, at most tj edges incident to j can be probed, where tj
denotes the patience level of user j. Both these are b-matching constraints; in fact when the graph is
bipartite, they are intersections of two partition matroids.
Our results will give an alternate way to obtain constant factor approximation algorithms for this
stochastic matching problem. Such algorithms were previously given by [12, 3], but they relied heav-
ily on the underlying graph structure. Additionally, our techniques allow for more general sets of
constraints. E.g., not all potential dates may be equally convenient to a user, and (s)he might pre-
fer dates with other nearby users. This can be modeled as a sequence of patience bounds for the
user, specifying the maximum number of dates that the user is willing to go outside her neighbor-
hood/city/state etc. In particular, if u1, u2, . . . , un denote the users in decreasing distance from user
j then there is a non-decreasing sequence 〈t1j , . . . , tnj 〉 of numbers where user j wishes to date at most
trj users among the r farthest other users {u1, . . . , ur}. This corresponds to the stochastic probing
problem, where the inner constraint remains matching but the outer constraint becomes a 2-system.
Our algorithm achieves a constant approximation even here.
1.3 Other Related Work
Dean et al. [14, 13] were the first to consider approximation algorithms for stochastic packing problems
in the adaptive optimization model. For the stochastic knapsack problem, where items have random
sizes (that instantiate immediately after selection), [14] gave a (3 + )-approximation algorithm; this
was improved to 2 +  in [6, 5]. [13] considered stochastic packing integer programs (PIPs) and gave
approximation guarantees matching the best known deterministic bounds. Our stochastic probing
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problem can be viewed as a two-level generalization of stochastic packing, with two different packing
constraints: one for probed elements, and one for chosen elements. However, all random variables in
our setting are {0, 1}-valued (each element is either active or not), whereas [14, 13] allow arbitrary
non-negative random variables.
Chen et al. [12] first studied a stochastic probing problem: they introduced the unweighted stochastic
matching problem and showed that greedy is a 4-approximation algorithm. Adamczyk [1] improved
the analysis to show a bound of 2. Both these proofs involve intricate arguments on the optimal
decision tree. In contrast, our analysis of greedy is much simpler and LP-based, and extends to the
more general setting of k-systems. (For the stochastic matching, our result implies a 4-approximation.)
Bansal et al. [3] gave a different LP proof that greedy is a 5-approximation for stochastic matching, but
their proof relied heavily on the graph structure, making the extension to general k-systems unclear.
[3] also gave the first O(1)-approximation for weighted stochastic matching, which was LP-based. ([12]
showed that natural greedy approaches for weighted stochastic matching are arbitrarily bad.) Our
algorithm for weighted probing is also LP-based, where we make use of the elegant abstraction of
“contention resolution schemes” introduced by Chekuri et al. [11] (see Section 3), which provides a
clean approach to rounding the LP.
The papers of Chawla et al. [9], Yan [25], and Kleinberg and Weinberg [19] study the performance
of Sequential Posted Price Mechanisms (SPMs) for Bayesian single-parameter auctions, and relate
the revenue obtained by SPMs to the optimal (non-posted-price) mechanism given by Myerson [21].
Our algorithm for stochastic probing also yields SPMs for Bayesian auctions where the feasible sets of
buyers are specified by, e.g., k-matroid intersection and unsplittable flow on trees. Our proof relates
an LP relaxation of the optimal mechanism to the LP used for stochastic probing. Linear programs
have been used to model optimal auctions in a number of settings; e.g., see Vohra [24]. Bhattacharya
et al. [7] also used LP relaxations to obtain approximately optimal mechanisms in a Bayesian setting
with multiple items and budget constrained buyers.
1.4 Preliminaries
Specifying Probing Algorithms. A solution (policy) to the stochastic probing problem is an
adaptive strategy of probing elements satisfying the constraints imposed by Iout and Iin. At any time
step t ≥ 1, let Qt denote the set of elements already probed and St the current solution (initially
Q1 = S1 = ∅); an element e ∈ V \ Qt can be probed at time t if and only if Qt ∪ {e} ∈ Iout and
St ∪ {e} ∈ Iin. If e is probed then exactly one of the following happens:
• e is active (with probability pe), and Qt+1 ← Qt ∪ {e}, St+1 ← St ∪ {e}, or
• e is inactive (with probability 1− pe), and Qt+1 ← Qt ∪ {e}, St+1 ← St.
Hence the policy is a decision tree with nodes representing elements that are probed and branches
corresponding to their random instantiations. Note that an optimal policy may be exponential sized,
and designing a polynomial-time algorithm requires tackling the question of whether there exist poly-
sized near-optimal strategies. A non adaptive policy is simply given by a permutation on V , where
elements are considered in this order and probed whenever feasible in both Iout and Iin. The adaptivity
gap compares the best non-adaptive policy to the best adaptive policy.
Packing Constraints. We model packing constraints as independence systems, which are of the
form (V, I ⊆ 2V ) where V is the universe and I is a collection of independent sets. We assume I is
downwards closed, i.e., A ∈ I and B ⊆ A =⇒ B ∈ I. Some examples are:
• Knapsack constraint : each element e ∈ V has size se ∈ [0, 1] and I = {A ⊆ V |
∑
e∈A se ≤ 1}.
• Matroid constraint : an independence system (V, I) where for any subset S ⊆ V , every maximal
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independent subset of S has the same size. See [23] for many properties and examples.
• k-system: an independence system (V, I) where for any subset S ⊆ V , every maximal indepen-
dent subset of S has size at least 1k times the size of the maximum independent subset of S.
For example: matroids are 1-systems, matchings are 2-systems, and intersections of k matroids
form k-systems.
• Unsplittable Flow Problem (UFP) on trees: there is an edge-capacitated tree T , and each element
e ∈ V corresponds to a path Pe in T and demand de. Subset S ⊆ V is independent (i.e. S ∈ I)
iff {path Pe with demand de}e∈S is routable in T . We assume the “no-bottleneck” condition,
where the maximum demand maxe∈V de is at most the minimum capacity in T .
When the universe is clear from context, we refer to an independence system (V, I) just as I. We
also make use of linear programming relaxations for independence systems: the LP relaxation of I
is denoted by P(I) ⊆ [0, 1]V and contains the convex hull of all independent sets. (Since P(I) is a
relaxation it need not equal the convex hull). For example: P(I) = {x ∈ [0, 1]V : ∑e∈V se · xe ≤ 1}
for knapsacks; P(I) = {x ∈ [0, 1]V : ∑e∈S xe ≤ rI(S),∀S ⊆ V } for matroids, where rI(·) denotes the
rank function.
1.5 Outline
We first consider the unweighted probing problem in Section 2. Then, in Section 3 we study the
weighted probing problem. In Section 4 we present the application to posted price mechanisms for
Bayesian auctions (Theorem 4.1). Finally, in Section 5 we study the generalization of unweighted
probing to the setting of global time constraints.
2 Unweighted Stochastic Probing
In this section, we study the stochastic probing problem with unit weights, i.e., we = 1 for all e ∈ V .
We assume the inner and outer packing constraints are a kin-system and a kout-system, repectively. We
show that the greedy algorithm, which considers elements in non-increasing order of their probabilities
pe and probes them when feasible, has performance claimed in Theorem 1.1. We give an LP-based
dual-fitting proof of this result.
For brevity, let us use k to denote kin, and k
′ to denote kout. Let the rank function of Iin be r : 2V → N,
where for each S ⊆ V , r(S) = max{|I| | I ∈ I, I ⊆ S} be the maximum size of an independent subset
of S. By definition of k-systems, for any S ⊆ V , any maximal independent set of S (according to
Iin) has size at least r(S)/k. Similarly, let r′ : 2V → N denote the rank function of Iout. We may
not be able to evaluate the rank function, since this is NP-complete for k ≥ 3. For any T ⊆ V , let
span(T ) = {e ∈ V : r(T ∪{e}) = r(T )} be the span of T . Likewise, let span′ denote the span function
for Iout.
Claim 2.1 For any T ⊆ V , the maximum independent subset of T (which has size r(T )) is a maximal
independent subset of span(T ). Hence, for T ⊆ V and R ⊆ V , we have r(span(T )) ≤ k · r(T ) ≤ k · |T |
and r′(span′(R)) ≤ k′ · r′(R) ≤ k′ · |R|.
Let us write the natural LP relaxation and dual for the probing problem:
max
∑
e∈V peye
s.t.
∑
e∈S peye ≤ r(S) ∀S ⊆ V∑
e∈S ye ≤ r′(S) ∀S ⊆ V
y ≥ 0.
min
∑
S r(S)α(S) +
∑
S r
′(S)β(S)
s.t. pe
∑
S:e∈S α(S) +
∑
S:e∈S β(S) ≥ pe ∀e ∈ V
α(S), β(S) ≥ 0 ∀S ⊆ V.
Claim 3.1 in the next section shows that this LP is a valid relaxation. It is not known if these linear
programs can be solved in polynomial time for arbitrary p-systems Iin and Iout; we use them only
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for the analysis. Note that the greedy algorithm defines a non-adaptive strategy. Consider a sample
path pi down the natural decision tree associated with the above algorithm; it is completely defined
by the randomness in which elements are active. Let Pr[pi] denote its probability, and Qpi, Spi be the
sets probed and picked on taking this path.
Lemma 2.2 If alg is the random variable denoting the number of elements picked,
E[alg] =
∑
pi
Pr(pi) · |Spi| =
∑
pi
Pr(pi) ·
∑
e∈Qpi
pe.
Proof: The first equality follows by definition of expectations, and the fact that elements are
unweighted. For the second, let pi<e be the outcomes of elements before e in the ordering. Note that
the event 1(e probed) is completely determined by pi<e. Moreover,
Pr[e picked | pi<e] = 1 (e probed | pi<e) · pe .
Hence, the expected value of the algorithm is
E[alg] =
∑
e
∑
pi<e
Pr[pi<e] · Pr[e picked | pi<e] =
∑
e
∑
pi<e
Pr[pi<e] · 1 (e probed | pi<e) · pe
=
∑
e
∑
pi
Pr[pi] · 1 (e probed | pi<e) · pe =
∑
e
∑
pi
Pr[pi] ·
∑
e∈Qpi
pe.
Above, we used the fact that e’s being probed (or equivalently, it’s lying in Qpi) was purely a function
of pi<e. And that e being active is independent of all others.
Lemma 2.3 For each outcome pi, there is a feasible dual of value at most k|Spi|+k′
∑
e∈Qpi pe. More-
over, there is a feasible dual of value at least (k + k′)E[alg].
The following proof is similar to that of Fisher et al. [15] showing that the greedy algorithm is a
k-approximation for the intersection of k matroids.
Proof: Let A = span(Spi) be the span of the set of picked elements Spi; note that by Claim 2.1,
r(A) ≤ k · |Spi|. We set α(A) = 1, and all other α variables to zero.
Let the set of probed elements Qpi = {a1, a2, . . . , a`} in this order. Define
β(span′({a1, a2, . . . , ah})) := pah − pah+1 ≥ 0
for all h ∈ {1, . . . , `} (where we imagine pa`+1 = 0). This is also well-defined since every subset of Qpi
is independent in Iout. The non-negativity follows from the greedy algorithm that probes elements in
decreasing probabilities. The dual objective value equals:
r(A) +
∑`
h=1
r′(span′({a1, a2, . . . , ah})) · (pah − pah+1) ≤ k · |Spi|+
∑`
h=1
k′ · h · (pah − pah+1),
which is k · |Spi|+k′
∑
e∈Qpi pe. The inequality is by Claim 2.1. Next we show that the dual solution is
feasible. The non-negativity is clearly satisfied, so it remains to check feasibility of the dual covering
constraints. For any e ∈ V ,
• Case I: e ∈ Qpi. Say e = ag in the ordering of the set Qpi . Then e lies in span′({a1, a2, . . . , ah})
for all h ≥ g. Hence, the left hand side of e’s covering constraint contributes at least
∑`
h=g
β(span′({a1, a2, . . . , ah})) =
∑`
h=g
(pah − pah+1) = pag = pe.
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• Case II: e 6∈ Qpi because of the outer constraint. Say e was seen when theQ set was {a1, a2, . . . , ag}.
Then e ∈ span′({a1, a2, . . . , ah}) for all h ≥ g. In this case, the left hand side contributes at
least ∑`
h=g
β(span′({a1, a2, . . . , ah})) =
∑`
h=g
(pah − pah+1) = pag ≥ pe.
Here we used the fact that elements are considered in decreasing order of their probabilities.
• Case III: e 6∈ Qpi because of the inner constraint. Then e ∈ span(Spi) = A, and hence the
pe
∑
S:e∈S α(S) = pe α(A) = pe.
This proves the first part of the lemma. Taking expectations over pi, the resulting convex combination∑
pi Pr[pi](αpi,βpi) of these feasible duals is another feasible dual of value kE[|Spi|] + k′ E[
∑
e∈Qpi pe],
which by Lemma 2.2 equals (k + k′)E[alg].
Our analysis for the greedy algorithm is tight. In particular, if all pe’s equal one, and the inner
and outer constraints are intersections of (arbitrary) partition matroids, then we obtain the greedy
algorithm for (kin + kout)-dimensional matching. The approximation ratio in this case is known to be
exactly kin + kout.
Application to Unweighted Stochastic Matching. When the inner constraint is matching
(which is a 2-system) and the outer constraint is b-matching (also a 2-system) on the same graph,
we obtain the unweighted stochastic matching problem of Chen et al. [12]. Hence Theorem 1.1
gives an alternate proof of greedy being a 4-approximation [12]. We know now that greedy is a
2-approximation [1], but we currently do not know an LP-based proof of this bound.
3 Weighted Stochastic Probing
We now turn to the general weighted case of stochastic probing. Here the natural combinatorial
algorithms perform poorly, so we use linear programming relaxations of the problem, which we round to
get non-adaptive policies. Given an instance of the stochastic probing problem with inner constraints
(V, Iin) and outer constraints (V, Iout), we use the following LP relaxation:
max
∑
e∈V we · xe
s.t. xe = pe · ye ∀e ∈ V (LP)
x ∈ P(Iin)
y ∈ P(Iout)
We assume that the LP relaxations of the inner and outer constraints can be solved efficiently: this is
true for matroids, knapsacks, UFP on trees, and their intersections. For general k-systems, it is not
known if this LP can be solved exactly. However, using the fact that the greedy algorithm achieves a
1
k -approximation for maximizing linear objective functions over k-systems (even with respect to the LP
relaxation, which follows from [15], or the proof of Lemma 2.3), and the equivalence of approximate
separation and optimization [17], we can obtain a 1max{kin,kout} -approximate LP solution when Iin andIout are arbitrary kin and kout systems.
Claim 3.1 The optimal value of (LP) ≥ optimal value of the probing instance.
Proof: Let y∗e denote the probability that element e is probed by the optimal strategy; i.e., y∗e =
Pr[e ∈ Q∗]. Also let x∗e denote the probability that element e is chosen in the final solution, x∗e =
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Pr[e ∈ S∗]. Due to the constraints, we have Q∗ ∈ Iout and S∗ ∈ Iin, and hence y∗ ∈ P(Iout) and
x∗ ∈ P(Iin). Moreover,
x∗e = Pr[e ∈ S∗] = Pr[e ∈ Q∗ and e active] = pe · Pr[e ∈ Q∗] = pe · y∗e , ∀e ∈ V.
Here we used the fact that the probability of element e being active is independent of the past decisions,
and in particular, of the optimal strategy’s decision to probe e. Thus (x∗, y∗) is a feasible solution to
LP. Finally, the optimal value of the probing problem instance is ∑e∈V we · Pr[e ∈ S∗] = ∑ewex∗e,
which is the LP objective value of (x∗, y∗).
3.1 Contention-Resolution Schemes
Given a solution (x, y) for the LP relaxation, we need to get a policy from it. Our rounding algorithm
is based on the elegant abstraction of contention resolution schemes (CR schemes), as defined in
Chekuri et al. [11]. Here is the formal definition, and the main theorem we will use.
Definition 3.2 An independence system (V,J ⊆ 2V ) with LP-relaxation P(J ) admits a monotone
(b, c) CR-scheme if, for any z ∈ P(J ) there is a (possibly randomized) mapping pi : 2V → J such
that:
(i) If I ⊆ V is a random subset where each element e ∈ V is chosen independently with probability
b · xe, PrI,pi[e ∈ pi(I) | e ∈ I] ≥ c for all e ∈ V .
(ii) For any e ∈ I1 ⊆ I2 ⊆ V , Prpi[e ∈ pi(I1)] ≥ Prpi[e ∈ pi(I2)].
(iii) The map pi can be computed in polynomial time.
Moreover, pi : 2V → J is a (b, c) ordered CR-scheme if there is a (possibly random) permutation
σ on V so that for each I ⊆ V , pi(I) is the maximal independent subset of I obtained by considering
elements in the order of σ.
Theorem 3.3 ([11, 10, 4, 9]) There are monotone CR-schemes for the following independence sys-
tems (below, 0 < b ≤ 1 is any value unless specified otherwise)
• (b, (1− e−b)/b) CR-scheme for matroids.
• (b, 1− k · b) ordered CR-scheme for k-systems.
• (b, 1−6b) ordered CR-scheme for unsplittable flow on trees, with the “no bottleneck” assumption,
for any 0 < b ≤ 1/60.
• (b, 1− 2kb) CR-scheme for k-column sparse packing integer programs.
The CR-scheme for k-systems can be inferred from Lemma 4.12 in [11] using the observation that
r(span(R)) ≤ k · |R| for any R ⊆ V in a k-system.
3.2 How to Round the LP Solution
Given the formalism of CR schemes, we can now state our main result for rounding a solution to the
relaxation (LP).
Theorem 3.4 Consider any instance of the stochastic probing problem with
(i) (b, cout) CR-scheme for P(Iout).
(ii) Monotone (b, cin) ordered CR-scheme for P(Iin).
Then there is a b·( cout + cin − 1 )-approximation algorithm for the weighted stochastic probing problem.
Before we prove Theorem 3.4, we observe that combining Theorems 3.4 and 3.3 gives us, for example:
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• a 1/(4(k + `))-approximation algorithm when the inner and outer constraints are intersections
of k and ` matroids respectively.
• an Ω(1)-approximation algorithm when the inner and outer constraints are unsplittable flows
on trees/paths satisfying the no-bottleneck assumption.
• an Ω (1/(k + `)2)-approximation algorithm when the inner and outer constraints are arbitrary
k and ` systems. Here, we lose an additional k + ` factor in solving LP approximately.
The Rounding Algorithm. Let piout denote the randomized mapping corresponding to a (b, cout)
CR-scheme for y ∈ P(Iout), and piin be that corresponding to a (b, cin) CR-scheme for x ∈ P(Iin). The
algorithm to round the LP solution (x, y) for weighted stochastic probing appears as Algorithm 3.1.
Algorithm 3.1 Rounding Algorithm for Weighted Probing
1: Pick I ⊆ 2V by choosing each e ∈ V independently with probability b · ye.
2: Let P = piout(I). (By definition of the CR scheme, P ∈ Iout with probability one.)
3: Order elements in P according to σ (the inner ordered CR scheme) to get e1, e2, . . . , e|P |.
4: Set S ← ∅.
5: for i = 1, . . . , |P | do
6: if (S ∪ {ei} ∈ Iin) then
7: Probe ei: set S ← S ∪ {ei} if ei is active, and S ← S otherwise.
The Analysis. We now show that E[w(S)] is large compared to the LP value
∑
ewexe. To begin, a few
observations about this algorithm. Note that this is a randomized strategy, since there is randomness
in the choice of I and maybe in the maps piout and piin. Also, by the CR scheme properties, the probed
elements are in Iout, and the chosen elements in Iin. Finally, having chosen the set P to (potentially)
probe, the elements actually probed in step 7 relies on the ordered CR scheme for the inner constraints.
In Appendix A we show that some simpler rounding algorithms that work for stochastic matching do
not apply in this more general setting.
Recall that I ⊆ V is the random set where each element e is included independently with probability
b · ye; also P = piout(I). Let J ⊆ V be the set of active elements; i.e., each e ∈ V is present in J
independently with probability pe. The set of chosen elements is now S = piin(P ∩ J). The main
lemma is now:
Lemma 3.5 For any e ∈ V ,
Pr
I,piout, J, piin
[e ∈ piin (piout(I) ∩ J)] ≥ b · (cout + cin − 1) · xe,
where b, cout, cin are parameters given by our CR-schemes.
Proof: Recall that P = piout(I), so we want to lower bound:
Pr[e ∈ piin(P ∩ J)] = Pr[e ∈ piin(P ∩ J) ∧ e ∈ I ∩ J ∩ P ]
= Pr[e ∈ I ∩ J ∩ P ]− Pr[e 6∈ piin(P ∩ J) ∧ e ∈ I ∩ J ∩ P ]
≥ bxe · cout − Pr[e 6∈ piin(P ∩ J) ∧ e ∈ I ∩ J ∩ P ], (1)
where the inequality uses Pr[e ∈ I ∩ J ] = bye · pe = bxe and Pr[e ∈ P = piout(I)|e ∈ I ∩ J ] ≥ cout by
Definition 3.2(i) applied to the outer CR scheme, since I is a random subset chosen according to b · y
where y ∈ P(Iout).
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We now upper bound Pr[e 6∈ piin(P ∩ J) ∧ e ∈ I ∩ J ∩ P ] by (1 − cin) · bxe which combined with (1)
would prove the lemma. Now, condition on any instantiation I = I1, P = piout(I1) = P1 ⊆ I1 and
J = J1 such that e ∈ I1 ∩ J1 ∩ P1. Then,
Pr[e 6∈ piin(P1 ∩ J1)] ≤ Pr[e 6∈ piin(I1 ∩ J1)], (2)
by Definition 3.2(ii) applied to the inner CR scheme (since e ∈ P1 ∩ J1 ⊆ I1 ∩ J1). Taking a linear
combination of the inequalities in (2) with respective multipliers Pr[I = I1, J = J1, P = P1] (where
e ∈ I1 ∩ J1 ∩ P1), we obtain
Pr[e 6∈ piin(P ∩ J) ∧ e ∈ I ∩ J ∩ P ] ≤ Pr[e 6∈ piin(I ∩ J) ∧ e ∈ I ∩ J ∩ P ]
≤ Pr[e 6∈ piin(I ∩ J) ∧ e ∈ I ∩ J ]
= bxe · Pr[e 6∈ piin(I ∩ J)|e ∈ I ∩ J ]
where the equality uses Pr[e ∈ I∩J ] = bye ·pe = bxe. The last expression above is at most bxe(1−cin)
by Definition 3.2(i) applied to the inner CR scheme, since I ∩ J is a random subset chosen according
to b · x where x ∈ P(Iin). This proves Pr[e 6∈ piin(P ∩ J)∧ e ∈ I ∩ J ∩P ] ≤ (1− cin) · bxe as desired.
Consequently, the expected weight of the chosen set S is
E
[∑
e∈S
we
]
=
∑
e∈V
we · Pr [e ∈ piin (P ∩ J)] ≥ b(cin + cout − 1) ·
∑
e∈V
we · xe.
The inequality uses Lemma 3.5. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.4.
Remark: We note that our results also hold in a slightly more general model where the elements are
not necessarily independent, but every set T ∈ Iout is mutually independent.2
• Observe that LP is a valid relaxation for stochastic probing, even in this setting. The only
change in the proof of Claim 3.1 is: if Q∗ and S∗ denote the sets of probed and chosen elements
in an optimal policy then Pr[e ∈ S∗] = Pr[e ∈ Q∗ and e active] = Pr[e ∈ Q∗] · Pr[e active | e ∈
Q∗] = Pr[e ∈ Q∗] ·pe, where the last equality uses the fact that at any point in the optimal policy
when e is probed, “element e being active” is independent of the previously observed elements
(which along with e is some set in Iout and hence is mutually independent).
• Moreover, in Lemma 3.5, if we let J ⊆ V denote the random subset where each element e
is present independently with probability pe and Ja ⊆ V the set of active elements, then
Pr [e ∈ piin (piout(I) ∩ Ja)] = Pr [e ∈ piin (piout(I) ∩ J)]. This is because, conditioning on any
I = I1 and P = piout(I1) = P1, the distributions of Ja ∩ P1 and J ∩ P1 are identical (by
mutual independence of P1).
4 Bayesian Single Parameter Mechanism Design
In this section, we show how a Bayesian single-parameter auction problem can be modeled as a
stochastic probing problem, yielding new posted-price mechanisms for such auctions.
Formally, we consider a Bayesian mechanism design problem with one seller and n single-parameter
agents that bid for service. The term “single-parameter” means that each agent i’s private informa-
tion is represented by a single number vi, which is the agent’s valuation. In the Bayesian setting,
the valuation vi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , B} is drawn from an independent probability distribution Di.3 These
2A set {Ei}`i=1 of events is mutually independent if for any subset L ⊆ [`] we have Pr [∧i∈LEi] = Πi∈L Pr[Ei].
3We can also handle continuous distributions by approximating them via discrete distributions, at the loss of a small
constant factor.
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valuations are private knowledge, but the distributions Di are publicly known. Each agent i ∈ [n]
submits a bid bi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , B} representing his valuation. The seller has a feasibility constraint given
by a downward closed set system I ⊆ 2[n], and hence can serve any set of agents from I.
A mechanism is a function that maps a bid-vector b ∈ {0, 1, . . . , B}n to an allocation A(b) ∈ I,
along with prices pii(b) to be paid by each agent i ∈ [n]. For notational convenience, we define
Xi(b) := 1i∈A(b) denoting whether or not agent i receives service. The utility of agent i under bids b
is vi ·Xi(b)− pii(b). We consider mechanisms satisfying the following standard properties:
• Voluntary participation: an agent pays only when receiving service and the payment is at most
his bid. For all bid vectors b, pii(b) ≤ Xi(b) · bi for all agents i ∈ [n].
• No positive transfers: the mechanism does not pay agents, pii(b) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [n] and b.
• Truthful in expectation: For each i ∈ [n] and vi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , B}, if vi is agent i’s true valuation
then his expected utility by bidding vi is at least his expected utility under any other bid
bi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , B}, i.e.,
Ebj←Dj :j 6=i [vi ·Xi(b−i, vi)− pii(b−i, vi)] ≥ Ebj←Dj :j 6=i [vi ·Xi(b−i, bi)− pii(b−i, bi)]
We are interested in designing a mechanism that maximizes the expected revenue. The well-known
Myerson mechanism [21] is optimal for the single-parameter setting, and it proceeds by reducing
the revenue maximization problem to the welfare-maximization setting (which can then be solved
using the VCG mechanism). However the resulting mechanism can be complicated to implement,
and is computationally hard under combinatorial feasibility constraints such as intersections of more
than two matroids. Hence, simpler mechanisms such as “sequential posted price mechanisms” (SPM)
are often desirable in practice; see [9, 25, 19] for further discussion on this. In an SPM, the seller
offers “take it or leave it” prices to the agents one-by-one. When the feasible set I is given by the
intersection of k matroid constraints, Chawla et al. [9] showed the existence of SPMs achieving a
1
k+1 -approximation to the optimal mechanism. However, when the posted prices are to be computed
in polynomial time, the approximation ratio becomes Ω(1/k2). Indeed, getting Ω(1/k)-approximate
SPMs for intersections of k ≥ 2 matroids was an open problem before this work.
In this section, we show that approximately optimal SPMs can be obtained as an application of
the stochastic probing problem. Since our algorithm for computing prices runs in polynomial time,
we obtain a polynomial time SPM for k-matroid constraints that is an Ω(1/k)-approximation to the
optimal mechanism. We proceed by first showing that computing the optimal posted price mechanism
is an instance of the matroid constrained probing problem. Then we show that the LP relaxation
of this probing problem (which we use for our algorithm) has value at least that of the optimal
(potentially non-posted price) mechanism as well, which completes the argument.
4.1 Posted Price Mechanism as Probing Problem
Given the distributions Di of each agent i ∈ [n], and the feasibility constraint I, we are interested
in computing a sequential posted price mechanism. This corresponds to setting prices pii for each
agent i ∈ [n], and making “take it or leave it” offers to agents in a suitable sequence (while ensuring
feasibility in I). A rational agent will accept an offer if and only if the posted price is at most his
valuation. It is clear that any such mechanism is truthful since the prices are independent of bids. In
fact this mechanism is truthful even when each agent knows the precise bids of all other agents, which
is a stronger condition than truthfulness in expectation.
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Consider an instance of the stochastic probing problem with:
• Universe V := {(i, c) : i ∈ [n], c ∈ {0, 1, . . . , B}}.
• Weights wi,c = c for all (i, c) ∈ V .
• Probabilities pi,c = Prvi←Di [vi ≥ c] for all (i, c) ∈ V .
• The outer constraint being a partition matroid: Iout consists of all subsets S ⊆ V with |S ∩
{(i, c)}Bc=0| ≤ 1 for all i ∈ [n]. This corresponds to offering at most one price to each agent.
• The inner constraint being the natural lifting of the seller’s feasibility constraint (on universe
[n]) to V , where {(i, c)}Bc=0 are copies of i. Formally, Iin consists of all subsets S ⊆ V with (a)
|S ∩ {(i, c)}Bc=0| ≤ 1 for all i ∈ [n] and (b) {i ∈ [n] : ∃(i, c) ∈ S} ∈ I.
Notice that if I is given by an intersection of p matroids then so is Iin.
Due to the outer constraint, a solution to this probing problem never probes two copies of the same
agent. This ensures two properties: (1) the independence assumption on elements of V agrees with
the auction setting where copies {(i, c)}Bc=0 of each agent i are actually dependent, and (2) we obtain
a posted price mechanism. Moreover, the inner constraint handles the feasibility constraint I. Thus,
solutions to this probing problem correspond precisely to sequential posted price mechanisms and
vice versa. Instead of modeling the elements {(i, c)}Bc=0 of each agent i as being active independently,
we could also model their joint distribution induced by Di: since every set in Iout is now mutually
independent, Theorem 3.4 still applies (as noted in the end of Section 3).
We can now use our algorithm for the weighted stochastic probing problem to obtain an approximately
optimal SPM. In the next subsection, we show that the optimal revenue (of any mechanism, which
may potentially be non-posted-price) is at most the value of the stochastic probing LP. Since our
approximation ratio for stochastic probing is relative to this LP, we obtain the following result (setting
b = 12k+1 , cin = 1− kb and cout = (1− e−b)/b ≥ 1− b/2 in Theorem 3.4)
Theorem 4.1 There is a polynomial-time sequential posted price mechanism for k matroid intersec-
tion constraints, which has revenue at least 14k+2 times the revenue of the optimal mechanism.
More generally, this result holds for any feasibility constraint I that admits an ordered CR scheme,
where the approximation ratio depends on the quality of the CR scheme. For example, this also
implies a constant factor approximate SPM when I is given by an unsplittable flow on trees.
4.2 Bounding the Optimal Mechanism
Recall that our algorithm for the weighted probing problem is based on the LP relaxation LP. For
instances corresponding to the Bayesian mechanism design problem (from the reduction above), this
LP is:
LPP = max
∑
i∈[n]
B∑
c=0
c · xi,c (3)
subject to xi,c = Pr[vi ≥ c] · yi,c ∀(i, c) ∈ V (4){
B∑
c=0
xi,c : i ∈ [n]
}
∈ P(I) (5)
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B∑
c=0
yi,c ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ [n] (6)
y ≥ 0. (7)
Constraint (5) is the inner constraint which is a lifting of I, and (6) is the outer partition matroid
constraint. We will show that the optimal value of this LP is least the value of the optimal mechanism
for the Bayesian auction problem. To do so, we want to write an LP relaxation for the optimal
mechanism. Consider any mechanism given by allocations {Xi(b)}i∈[n] and prices {pii(b)}i∈[n] as
functions of bids. For each i ∈ [n] and c ∈ {0, 1, . . . , B}, define:
zi,c := Ebj←Dj :j 6=i [Xi(b−i, c)] and qi,c := Ebj←Dj :j 6=i [pii(b−i, c)] .
For each agent i and value c, when agent i bids c, zi,c is the probability that i is served by the mechanism
and qi,c is the expected price that i is charged (both expectations are taken over valuations of all other
agents [n] \ i).
Lemma 4.2 (Myerson [21], Archer and Tardos [2]) Any mechanism that satisfies truthfulness
in expectation and voluntary participation has:
A. zi,c is non-decreasing in c, for all i ∈ [n].
B. qi,c ≤ c · zi,c −
∑c−1
h=0 zi,h for all c ∈ {0, 1, . . . , B} and i ∈ [n].
Proof: We provide a proof for completeness. Fix any agent i ∈ [n]. For the first property, we will
show that zi,c1 ≤ zi,c2 for any values c1 < c2. By the truthfulness condition when i’s true valuation is
c1 and he bids c2,
c1 · zi,c1 − qi,c1 ≥ c1 · zi,c2 − qi,c2 .
Similarly when i’s true valuation is c2 and he bids c1,
c2 · zi,c2 − qi,c2 ≥ c2 · zi,c1 − qi,c1 .
Adding the above two inequalities and rearranging, we get (c2 − c1)(zi,c2 − zi,c1) ≥ 0, i.e., zi,c2 ≥ zi,c1
as desired. This proves the monotonicity of zi,∗.
For the second property, fix also any value c. For each h ≤ c, when i’s true valuation is h and he bids
h− 1, by truthfulness:
qi,h − qi,h−1 ≤ h · zi,h − h · zi,h−1.
Adding this inequality over all h ∈ {1, . . . , c},
qi,c − qi,0 ≤ c · zi,c −
c−1∑
h=0
zi,h.
Now, voluntary participation implies that qi,0 = 0, which proves the desired inequality.
Also define xi :=
∑B
c=0 Pr[vi = c] · zi,c for each i ∈ [n]. This denotes the probability that agent i is
served by the mechanism when all agents bid their true valuation.
Claim 4.3 {xi : i ∈ [n]} ∈ P(I).
Proof: The feasibility constraint imposed by I implies that {Xi(b) : i ∈ [n]} ∈ I for each b ∈
{0, 1, . . . , B}n. Since P(I) is a relaxation of I, it is clear that {Xi(b) : i ∈ [n]} ∈ P(I) for all b.
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Since P(I) is a convex set, we have ∑b λ(b) · {Xi(b)} ∈ P(I) for any convex multipliers λs. Setting
λ(b) := Pr [vj = bj ∀j ∈ [n]] = Πni=j Pr[vj = bj ], for each i ∈ [n] we have
∑
b λ(b) ·Xi(b) equal to
=
B∑
c=0
Pr[vi = c] ·
∑
b−i
Pr[vj = bj : j 6= i] ·Xi(b−i, c) =
B∑
c=0
Pr[vi = c] · zi,c = xi.
Thus we obtain {xi} ∈ P(I) as claimed.
Combining Lemma 4.2 and Claim 4.3 we obtain the following LP relaxation for valid mechanisms:
LPM = max
∑
i∈[n]
B∑
c=0
Pr[vi = c] ·
[
c · zi,c −
c−1∑
h=0
zi,h
]
(8)
subject to 0 ≤ zi,0 ≤ zi,1 ≤ · · · ≤ zi,B ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ [n] (9)
xi =
B∑
c=0
Pr[vi = c] · zi,c ∀i ∈ [n] (10)
{xi : i ∈ [n]} ∈ P(I). (11)
We note that this LP is, in fact, a relaxation of the optimal mechanism, and the optimal value of this
LP may be strictly larger than that of the optimal mechanism. (E.g. for a single matroid constraint,
this gap can be as large as ee−1 .) It is also known that this gap can be closed by adding exponentially
many valid inequalities—the so-called Border inequalities. However, this is not important for the
current development, and the interested reader may refer to [24] for a thorough treatment of this area.
We are now ready to relate the above two LPs: LPM , which is a relaxation of the optimal mechanism,
and LPP , our relaxation of the stochastic probing instance.
Lemma 4.4 LPP ≥ LPM . Hence the optimal LP value of the stochastic probing instance is at least
the revenue of the optimal mechanism.
Proof: Given any feasible solution 〈zi,c, xi〉 to LPM , we construct a feasible solution 〈xi,c, yi,c〉 to
LPP of the same objective value. Set yi,c := zi,c − zi,c−1 for all i ∈ [n] and c ∈ {0, 1, . . . , B}; using
zi,−1 = 0. Note that y ≥ 0 due to constraint (9). Also
∑B
c=0 yi,c = zi,B ≤ 1 for each i ∈ [n]. This
shows that constraints (6)-(7) in LPP are satisfied.
Since xi,c = Pr[vi ≥ c] · yi,c = Pr[vi ≥ c] · (zi,c − zi,c−1), we have for each i ∈ [n],
B∑
c=0
xi,c =
B∑
c=0
Pr[vi ≥ c] · (zi,c − zi,c−1) =
B∑
c=0
zi,c · (Pr[vi ≥ c]− Pr[vi ≥ c+ 1]) ,
which equals
∑B
c=0 zi,c · Pr[vi = c] = xi. Thus constraint (11) in LPM implies constraint (5) in LPP .
Finally, the objective value (3) of LPP is:
∑
i∈[n]
B∑
c=0
c · xi,c =
∑
i∈[n]
B∑
c=0
c · Pr[vi ≥ c] · (zi,c − zi,c−1)
=
∑
i∈[n]
B∑
c=0
zi,c · (c · Pr[vi ≥ c]− (c+ 1) · Pr[vi ≥ c+ 1])
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=
∑
i∈[n]
B∑
c=0
zi,c · (c · Pr[vi = c]− Pr[vi ≥ c+ 1])
=
∑
i∈[n]
B∑
c=0
Pr[vi = c] · c · zi,c −
∑
i∈[n]
B∑
c=0
zi,c ·
B∑
h=c+1
Pr[vi = h]
=
∑
i∈[n]
B∑
c=0
Pr[vi = c] · c · zi,c −
∑
i∈[n]
B∑
c=0
Pr[vi = c] ·
c−1∑
h=0
zi,h,
which is exactly the objective (8) of LPM .
5 Unweighted Probing with Deadlines
In this section we consider a generalization of the stochastic probing problem in the presence of global
time. Each probe requires one unit of time and each element e ∈ V has a deadline de (in the global
time) after which it expires. As before, we have inner Iin and outer Iout packing constraints on the
set of chosen and probed elements respectively. We show that a natural greedy algorithm achieves
a good approximation for unit-weighted stochastic probing with deadlines, when the inner and outer
constraints are k-systems.
Theorem 5.1 There is a 12(kin+kout+1) -approximation algorithm for unweighted stochastic probing
with deadlines, when Iin and Iout are kin- and kout-systems.
The main idea is to relax the global deadline constraints into an outer laminar matroid constraint L,
and then relate the deadline probing problem to the usual probing problem with outer constraints
Iout ∩ L and inner constraints Iin. The laminar matroid L is defined as follows.
L := {U ⊆ V : |U ∩ {e : de ≤ t}| ≤ t, ∀t ≥ 1}
Notice that the sets Dt = {e : de ≤ t} for t ≥ 1 form a chain family4, and so L is indeed a laminar
matroid.
Algorithm 5.1 Greedy Algorithm for Unweighted Probing with Deadlines
1: Q← ∅, S ← ∅, B ← ∅ and t← 1.
2: for e in non-increasing order of pe value do
3: if Q ∪ {e} ∈ Iout ∩ L then
4: if S ∪ {e} ∈ Iin then
5: Q← Q ∪ {e} (i.e., potentially probe e)
6: if t ≤ de then
7: probe element e, and t← t+ 1.
8: if e active (happens with probability pe) then
9: S ← S ∪ {e} (i.e., pick e)
10: else
11: B ← B ∪ {e}.
12: S ← S ∪ {e} with probability pe; and S ← S otherwise.
The variable t in Algorithm 5.1 tracks the global time, which increases by one after each probe. The
probed elements are are Q \B and the chosen elements are S \B. Observe that the algorithm defines
a feasible policy since elements are only probed before their respective deadlines, and both inner Iin
and outer Iout constraints are satisfied. We use the sets Q,S,B to couple:
4A chain family is a collection of subsets D1 ⊆ D2 ⊆ · · ·Dn.
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• this algorithm for the deadline probing instance J , and
• the greedy algorithm (Section 2) for the usual probing instance K having inner constraints Iin
and outer constraints Iout ∩ L.
Clearly, any feasible policy for J is also feasible for K. Note that the greedy algorithm for K will
probe elements Q and choose elements S. This is the reason why sets Q and S are updated even when
a probe does not occur in J . Also, B denotes the set of elements that are probed in K but not in
J . Consider a decision path pi down the decision trees associated with J and K; note that we couple
instantiations in the two decision trees. By the analysis in Section 2, the algorithm’s objective in K is
E[alg(K)] =
∑
pi
Pr(pi) ·
∑
e∈Qpi
pe ≥ opt(K)
kin + kout + 1
.
Recall that K has an inner kin-system Iin and outer (kout + 1)-system Iout ∩ L. Moreover, the
algorithm’s objective in J is
E[alg(J )] =
∑
pi
Pr(pi) ·
∑
e∈Qpi\Bpi
pe.
The next lemma relates these two quantities.
Lemma 5.2 For any outcome pi,
∑
e∈Qpi pe ≤ 2 ·
∑
e∈Qpi\Bpi pe.
Proof: This proof also relies crucially on the greedy ordering in terms of probabilities. Note that
each element e ∈ Bpi must have been considered at time t > de. Moreover, time t is increased only by
elements Qpi \Bpi. Now by the greedy ordering,
|(Qpi \Bpi) ∩ {f : pf ≥ pe}| ≥ de, ∀e ∈ Bpi. (12)
Furthermore, since Qpi ∈ L we also have Bpi ⊆ Qpi ∈ L. So,
|Bpi ∩ {f : df ≤ de}| ≤ de, ∀e ∈ Bpi. (13)
Consider a bipartite graph H with left vertices Bpi and right vertices Qpi \Bpi, with an edge between
e ∈ Bpi and f ∈ Qpi \ Bpi iff pe ≤ pf . We claim that there is a left-saturating matching in H. It
suffices to show Hall’s condition that for any subset R ⊆ Bpi, its neighborhood |Γ(R)| ≥ |R|. Let
e := arg max{dg : g ∈ R}. Then, we have |R| ≤ de using (13), and |Γ(R)| ≥ |Γ(e)| ≥ de by (12). Since
graph H has a left-saturating matching, it is clear that
∑
e∈Bpi pe ≤
∑
e∈Qpi\Bpi pe.
Using this lemma, and the above bounds for alg(J ) and alg(K),
alg(J ) ≥ opt(K)
2(kin + kout + 1)
≥ opt(J )
2(kin + kout + 1)
.
The last inequality uses the fact that instance K is a relaxation of instance J . This proves the first
part of Theorem 5.1.
Stochastic matching with deadlines. We give an application of Theorem 5.1 in the kidney
exchange setting. Consider a set of patients in a hospital, where each patient j is expected to be
in the system for dj days. For each pair i, j of patients, there is a probability pi,j of having a
successful match. On each day, the hospital can perform one compatibility test and surgery between
some pair of patients. If patient j is not matched by day dj , he/she is assumed to have left the
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system. The difference from the usual stochastic matching [12, 3] is that the “timeout level” of
each patient decreases every day, irrespective of whether he is probed. The goal is to schedule tests
so as to maximize the expected number of matched patients. This can be modeled as the probing
problem with deadlines, on groundset V being the edges of the complete graph on patients. Each
edge (i, j) has deadline min{di, dj} and probability pi,j . There is no outer constraint, and the inner
constraint requires the chosen edges to form a matching (2-system). Hence Theorem 5.1 implies a
1
6 -approximation algorithm for this problem.
We note that an LP based approach as in [3] can also be used to obtain an approximation ratio of
1/6 for this problem. However the above greedy algorithm is much simpler and extends to general
k-system constraints. For the weighted case, our result (Theorem 3.4) does not seem to extend directly
to this setting of deadlines. We leave this as an open question.
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A Bad Examples for Simpler LP-Rounding Algorithms
Here we observe that some natural LP-rounding algorithms that work for stochastic matchings [3]
do not work in the setting of general matroids. Let (x, y) denote a solution to the linear relaxation
LP. Consider rounding this solution by considering elements to probe in the following order, where
each element e is probed with probability b · ye when permitted by the inner and outer constraints
(0 < b ≤ 1 is some constant).
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• Decreasing we value. There is no inner constraint, and the outer constraint is a graphic matroid
on the graph G (see Figure 1) consisting of edges E := {ei}ni=1
⋃{fi}ni=1 and g. The weights on
edges E are M  1 each, and w(g) = 1. The probabilities on edges E are   1nM each, and
p(g) = 1. The fractional solution y has value one on edge g and value 1/2 on each of E; the LP
objective is at least one. The expected weight from E is at most 2nM. Since edge g appears
last in this order, the probability that g is not blocked by the outer graphic matroid is at most
(1 − b2/4)n. (Note that if any edge of E is blocked then so is g.) So the expected total weight
of the rounding algorithm is at most 2nM+ (1− b2/4)n  1.
• Decreasing pe value. Again, there is no inner constraint and the outer constraint is a graphic
matroid on G (see Figure 1). The weights on E are one, and w(g) = L n. The probabilities
on E are one, and p(g) = 1/2. y has value one on edge g and value 1/2 on each of E; so the LP
objective is at least L/2. The expected weight from E is at most 2n L. As before, since edge
g appears last in this order, the expected weight from g is at most L · (1− b2/4)n  L. Hence
the expected total weight is  L.
• Decreasing we·pe value. There is no outer constraint and the inner constraint is a graphic matroid
on graph H (see Figure 1), which consists of edges E := {ei}ni=1
⋃{fi}ni=1 and E′ := {gj}Nj=1.
We set N = n2. The weights are two on E, and N on E′. The probabilities are 1/3 on E, and
1
3N on E
′. y has value one on all edges, and the LP objective is at least N/3. This order puts
edges of E before edges of E′. The probability that any particular edge of E′ is not blocked in
the inner graphic matroid is at most (1 − b2/9)n << 1. Thus the expected weight from E′ is
at most N2 · (1 − b2/9)n · 13N  N . The expected weight from E is at most 4n  N . So the
expected total weight is again much lesser than the LP objective.
g
e1
e2
en fn
f2
f1
g1
e1
e2
en fn
f2
f1
g2
gN
Graph G
Graph H
Figure 1: Graphic matroids on G and H.
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